CIoTA: Collaborative IoT Anomaly Detection via Blockchain by Golomb, Tomer et al.
CIoTA: Collaborative IoT Anomaly
Detection via Blockchain
Tomer Golomb, Yisroel Mirsky and Yuval Elovici
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
{golombt, yisroel}@post.bgu.ac.il, {elovici}@bgu.ac.il
Abstract—Due to their rapid growth and deployment, Internet
of things (IoT) devices have become a central aspect of our daily
lives. However, they tend to have many vulnerabilities which can
be exploited by an attacker. Unsupervised techniques, such as
anomaly detection, can help us secure the IoT devices. However,
an anomaly detection model must be trained for a long time in
order to capture all benign behaviors. This approach is vulnerable
to adversarial attacks since all observations are assumed to be
benign while training the anomaly detection model.
In this paper, we propose CIoTA, a lightweight framework
that utilizes the blockchain concept to perform distributed and
collaborative anomaly detection for devices with limited re-
sources. CIoTA uses blockchain to incrementally update a trusted
anomaly detection model via self-attestation and consensus among
IoT devices. We evaluate CIoTA on our own distributed IoT
simulation platform, which consists of 48 Raspberry Pis, to
demonstrate CIoTA’s ability to enhance the security of each
device and the security of the network as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is the next evolution of the
Internet [12]. Leading IoT experts believe that by 2020 there
will be more than 50 billion devices connected to the Internet
which will offer a variety of applications and services for both
daily and critical uses [8]. The vision for these IoT devices is
that they will autonomously communicate with one another to
improve services and our daily lives.
Like any new architecture or technology, the IoT improves
our lives but introduces disruptive elements as well. One
known issue associated with IoT devices is that they tend to
have vulnerabilities, which in some cases go unpatched by the
manufacturer. An attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities for
nefarious purposes [20]. Since IoT devices have been inte-
grated into both daily and critical applications, their security
is a significant concern.
One solution for protecting an IoT device is to install an
intrusion detection system (IDS) [9]. If the IDS is anomaly-
based, it has the potential to detect new and emerging threats
that target the device. However, there are two fundamental
challenges with anomaly-based IDSs:
1) Adversarial Attacks During the training phase, all ob-
servations are considered benign and are used to train
a model which captures the device’s normal behavior.
After the training phase, the model enters an execution
phase where it is used to detect when newly observed
behaviors deviate from the norm. Therefore, an attacker
who exploits a device before the execution phase can
evade detection entirely.
2) False Positive It is likely that false positives will occur if
an anomaly detection model is trained on the observations
of just a few devices. This is because some legitimate
behaviors are rare and event-based, and therefore may not
appear in the training data. For example, the motion de-
tection logic of a smart camera or the response generated
by a smoke detector sensing a fire.
However, consider the following scenario. Assume that all
IoT devices of the same type simultaneously begin training
their own anomaly detection model, based on their own locally
observed behaviors. In this scenario, it is unlikely that the
majority of these IoT devices would be exploited before they
completes their training phases.
Using this underlying assumption, we present CIoTA (pro-
nounced as syota): a lightweight, scalable framework which
utilizes the blockchain concept to perform distributed and
collaborative anomaly detection on resource limited devices,
such as IoT devices.
The blockchain is a protocol for maintaining a distributed
ledger. The ledger is a chain of blocks which is collectively
agreed upon by the majority of participants in the network
[23]. Each block is accepted into the chain if it can achieve
consensus represented as the satisfaction of specific criteria
(e.g., the proof of work criterion in bitcoin [15]). In the
context of a device from a specific model, CIoTA uses the
blockchain protocol to collaborate among devices of the same
type to create a trusted anomaly detection model. This is
accomplished by merging locally trained models into a single
global model. A block is a set of locally trained models from
different devices. Each device validates the integrity of a block
in progress by merging the models and by performing self-
attestation. When the block reaches a size limit, it is closed and
a new block begins. One closed block in the chain represents
a trusted model which has been validated by the majority
of devices in the system, and is therefore ready to be used
(executed on-site). However, one may wish to track a chain of
models, since a stronger model can be created by combining
multiple blocks together.
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The anomaly detection model used by CIoTA is an exten-
sible Markov model (EMM). The EMM tracks a program’s
regular memory jump sequences and can be incrementally
updated and merged with other models. To introduce new
benign concepts into the merged model, we accept new states
to the EMM only when there is a consensus among the models.
We evaluate CIoTA on our own IoT emulation platform,
involving 48 Raspberry Pis. Our evaluation demonstrates
CIoTA’s capability in detecting local attacks, and CIoTA’s
resistance against adversarial attacks (on CIoTA itself). To
encourage further research and development, the reader may
download our data and source code from GitHub1.
II. RELATED WORKS
One proposed solution for protecting IoT devices is to
deploy an anomaly-based IDS on the device itself [3], [17],
[19], [24]. However, these solutions neglect the facts that
(1) the training phase is sensitive to adversarial attacks, and
(2) rare benign activities (which do not appear in the initial
training data) can cause false positives. Furthermore, some of
these solutions [1], [11], [18] require a centralized server and
therefore do not scale well to large numbers of IoT devices.
Unlike other IDS solutions, CIoTA continuously learns, is
robust to adversarial attacks, and is highly scalable.
Another solution, proposed in the literature, is to deploy a
network-based IDS (NIDS) [5], [24]. However, in many cases,
IoT devices cannot be topologically placed behind a NIDS,
making these solutions impractical. CIoTA does not depend
on the IoT device’s network topology, and therefore can be
applied in a general environment.
In [10], [16] the authors propose deploying static analysis
tools on the IoT devices. However, this approach requires
that (1) the device maintains a database of virus signatures
and (2) that experts continuously update this database. CIoTA
is anomaly-based and therefore updates itself automatically
without human intervention.
Other researchers have tried to avoid the issue of training
altogether, by using a trust anchor, such as an IoT device’s
functional relationship. In [13], the authors propose executing
every computation twice across different IoT devices and then
compare the results to detect deviations (infected devices).
However, this method was only designed to secure against
specific types of attacks, whereas CIoTA is generic.
Other trust anchors are the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
[14] and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [25]. ARM’s
TrustZone [22] is a TEE implemented in the hardware, provid-
ing a one-way separation between two worlds: “unsecured” and
“secured”. C-FLAT [1] utilizes the TrustZone for attesting the
IoT device’s control-flow behavior against a simulation run in
parallel on a central server. Although an application’s control-
flow can be used to detect a vast range of code execution
attacks, C-FLAT is limited to specific IoT devices which (1) do
not execute code continuously or (2) devices whose behavior
is not affected by external sensory events (e.g., smart cameras).
CIoTA analyzes control-flow behavior to detect abnormalities
on site and therefore does not have the limitations of C-FLAT.
1https://git.io/vAIvd
III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND & NOTATION
A. Terminology
Model An anomaly detection model M that supports (1)
the calculation of a distance between models, and (2)
combining (merging) several models of the same type
together. We denote a model which is currently deployed
on a local device as ML.
Verified Model Let d(Mi,Mj) be the distance between mod-
els Mi and Mj . A model Mv is said to be verified by
a device if d(ML,Mv) < α, where α is a user given
parameter of the system.
Combined Model A model created by merging a set of mod-
els together. The combined model only contains elements
which are present in at least pc percent of the models in
the set.
Report A record consisting of a model m and a cryptographic
signature S(m, seed) that uses a private key on the model
and a random seed.
Block A list of reports on the same seed from different devices
which have precisely L entries. If a block has less than
L records, then it is referred to as a partial block or
as a block in progress. A device would contribute to
expanding a partial block only if it deem the block content
as verified.
Trusted Model The combined model is resulting by merging
the models in the reports of the most recently closed
block. Since reports come from different devices (verify
by their signatures), and the reports are verified at each
extension of the block, the combined model is considered
to have collaborative trust.
Chain A blockchain consisting of CIoTA’s blocks for a spe-
cific type of IoT device. The block’s acceptance criterion
is for the block to include precisely L entries, while the
criterion for accepting a partial block is for the combined
model which results from merging the models, to be a
verified model. The length of a chain is the total number
of completed blocks in that chain. Finally, a chain may
have at most one partial block appended to the end of the
chain.
Agent A program that runs on an IoT device which is respon-
sible for (1) training and executing the local model ML,
(2) downloading broadcasted chains to replace ML and
the locally stored chain, and (3) periodically broadcasting
the locally stored chain, with the latest ML as a report in
the partial block. An agent only replaces his/her locally
stored chain if the downloaded chain is longer than
the existing chain. Furthermore, an agent only uses the
downloaded chain’s partial block if the agent can attest
that the combined model, resulting from the partial block,
is a verified model.
B. Extensible Markov Model (EMM)
A Markov chain (MC) model is a memory-less process,
i.e., a process where the probability of transition at time t
only depends on the state at time t and not on any of the
states leading up that state. Typically, an MC is represented
as an adjacent matrix M , such that Mij stores the probability
of transitioning from state i to state j at any given time t.
Formally, if Xt is the random variable representing the state
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at time t, then
Mij = Pr(Xt+1 = j|Xt = i) (1)
An EMM [4] is the incremental version of the MC. Let N =
[nij ] be the frequency matrix, such that nij is the number of
transitions which have occurred from state i to state j. From
here, the MC can be obtained by
M = [Mij ] =
[
nij
ni
]
(2)
where ni =
∑
j ni,j is the total number of outgoing transitions
observed by state i.
In CIoTA, an MC captures an application’s control-flow
asynchronously by using Hardware counters. To restrict the
size of the MC, a state in the MC is a region (an address range)
in the application’s memory. Finally, a transition is the prob-
ability that the program will jump from region i to region j.
To update the EMM, an agent increments nij asynchronously,
whenever a control-flow event occurs. Anomalies are detected
when the observed Mij is less than a user defined probability
pthr.
Let N be a set of EMM models, and let N(k)ij be the
element Nij in the k-th model in N. To create a combined
model from the set N, Algorithm 1 is performed, where pc is
the minimum consensus percent requirement for distinguishing
between attacks and rare behaviors. After forming the MC
model M from N using (2), an agent can attest that M is
a verified model using Algorithm 2, where α ∈ [0, 1] is the
verification distance cutoff, provided by the user.
IV. THE CIOTA BLOCKCHAIN
A. Overview
As a manner of analogy, let’s assume that there is an agency
called CIoTA which has many agents, each of which is in
enemy’s territory. Their mission is to continuously (1) detect
malicious acts, and (2) gather Intel about what is happening
and periodically share a collection of Intel (as rumors) with
other agents. Since an agent is in the enemy’s territory, the
agent may receive false Intel which introduces noise into the
rumors conveyed to the other agents. Therefore, an agent will
only trust a rumor (some Intel) if the agent knows that at least
pc other agents have heard the same rumor. Finally, an agent
accepts the most recent set of L trusted rumors as the latest
description of the territory.
This scenario is implemented in the CIoTA framework as
follows. Each IoT device has an agent which maintains a local
model ML that is used to detect malicious behaviors in a
particular application. An agent records new Intel by updating
ML with observations on the application’s behavior. An agent
shares its Intel (ML)2, in the form of a rumor, by adding
ML to the chain’s partial block, and then sending the chain
to neighboring agents in the network. Other agents will only
accept this partial block if it is longer than their partial block,
and if they can attest that it is safe (by verifying it against
their own local model). Thus, the partial block only grows
if the majority of agents have verified that it contains a safe
2An MC is converted during sending and reception to match the device
state (ASLR).
Algorithm 1 The algorithm for combining a set of EMMs.
function COMBINE(N, pc)
N ← empty EMM() . initialize empty freq. matrix
for nij ∈ N do
C ← 0 . init the consensus counter
for k ∈ 1 : |N| do
nij ← nij +N(k)ij
if N(k)ij > 0 then
C ++
if C|N| ≤ pc then . no consensus on element ij
nij ← 0
return N
Algorithm 2 The algorithm for attesting that the MC M is a
verified model with respect to the local model ML
function VERIFYML (M ,α)
l1 ← 0 . init linear norm
for Mij ∈M do
l1 ← l1 + |Mij −ML,ij |
nstates ←dim(ML)
if l1nstates ≤ α then . the linear distance is acceptable
return True
else . the linear distance is too large
return False
model. Once the partial block have L reports, it is closed
as a completed block. Therefore, an agent receives the latest
intelligence from its fellow agents by replacing ML with the
combined model contained within the newest closed block.
Finally, to ensure that the rumors have indeed come from a
specific agent, record (rumors) are signed by a private key and
verified with the respective public key.
B. An Agent’s Processes
The following describes an agent’s three parallel processes,
as illustrated in the flowchart in Fig. 1.
1) Gather Intelligence: For simplicity, each IoT device
starts by creating its local model ML and then goes on to
continuously collect Intel about its territory (local application),
and continuously detect anomalies in the collected Intel using
ML. If the ML does not raise an alert, the device updates ML
to support the new Intel. An exception is when ML is a new
model, as opposed to a combined model downloaded from the
chain. In this case, ML is given a brief period of training from
all Intel unconditionally. If infected, this short period will not
affect the other agents, since rumors (broadcasted models) are
only accepted if verified by the majority of agents.
2) Receive Intelligence: When the local agent A receives
chain CB from agent B, A checks if CB is (1) longer than
CA and (2) contains valid signatures. If these conditions hold,
then the blocks in CA are replaced by those in CB , and the last
completed block is used to form a combined model (Algorithm
1) which replaces ML. If the partial block in CB is longer
than the partial block in CA and the combined model from
the partial block passes the validation test in Algorithm 2,
then CA is updated with the partial block from CB .
3
Fig. 1. A flow-chart of an agent’s three asynchronous processes.
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Fig. 2. CIoTA High level protocol
3) Share Intelligence: Periodically every T time elapses,
an agent updates its report in the locally stored chain’s partial
block. The agent then broadcasts the entire locally stored chain
to all neighboring agents.
To further illustrate the system, let’s assume CIoTA has
been installed on a set of IoT smart bulbs, and the maximum
number of reports in a block (L) is 3. Each device maintains
a list of the last N blocks, Bn−N to Bn, to limit the amount
of memory consumed by the locally stored chain. If there is
no partial block, a bulb can create a new partial block or
add/update the existing partial block. Fig. 2(a) illustrates the
green bulb’s attempt to create Bn+1 with the device’s report
on its model, MG,L and randomly generated seedn+1. In Fig.
2(b) the blue bulb contributes to Bn+1 by expanding Bn+1
with its report, which is a signature on MB,L and seedn+1.
The yellow bulb completes the block by adding its report to
the block, causing all of the agents to update their model with
a combined model based on all of the models in Bn+1. (Fig.
2(c)).
C. The Security of the Chain
CIoTA’s central assumption is that an attacker cannot
exploit a large number of devices within a short period, while
simultaneously evading ML’s detection. CIoTA also assumes
that the reports in a block came from the reporting device;
otherwise, an attacker could merely broadcast fake chains. To
validate the source, CIoTA can use either (1) PKI (public-key
infrastructure [2]), which allows identification and authentica-
tion of every device, or (2) a shared secret (symmetric key)
among the agents, which prevents an outsider’s interference in
the protocol.
PKI management is cumbersome and introduces new dan-
gers [7], and therefore we implement CIoTA using symmetric
key encryption inside the IoT devices’ TrustZone. The Trust-
Zone is a safe house on a device which has access to untrusted
territory within the device. In this setup, the agent, along with a
symmetric encryption key (provided by the admin), are located
in the TrustZone. By doing so, the agent will be able to
securely communicate with other agents, while avoiding the
issues of PKI. However, an incorrect implementation can lead
to severe vulnerabilities that affect the whole network.
V. ATTACKS AGAINST CIOTA
In this section, we discuss possible attack vectors against
CIoTA and their implications.
A. Attacks Against the Agent
The goal of an attacker is to execute his/her own persistent
logic on the IoT device. An attacker might, during the attack,
negatively affect ML either before or after the training phase.
In both cases the effect will occur before the agent shares it
with other agents via the partial block. However, in this case,
the majority of agents will either (1) reject the partial block
because the verification Algorithm (2) will fail, or (2) omit
the additional behaviors (new transitions) while forming the
combined model in Algorithm (1). Moreover, if the agent is in
the TrustZone, then ML will be replaced when the next block
will closed, and then the malware will be detected.
Another possibility is that the attacker will try and sabotage
the agent. However, since the agent is installed at a higher level
than the infected application (e.g., either kernel or TrustZone),
accessing the agent’s memory address will require additional
exploits. This requirement creates a catch-22 since the attacker
needs to perform additional actions (by exploiting the device
further) to access the agent, yet doing so creates anomalies in
the control-flow which in turn raises alerts.
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B. Attacks Against the CIoTA Chain
An attacker can alter the anomaly detection model by
creating the same alterations to at least pc percent of the
models inside the partial block, and then broadcast the chain.
However, this is challenging because (1) the deployment may
be widespread geographically, and (2) the attacker must obtain
a large number of private keys when employing PKI or extract
the symmetric key from the TrustZone. We note that to ensure
a strong level of security, the values of pc and L should be
relatively large, and PKI should be used if possible.
C. Detection Policies
While detection is a powerful tool for security, without
action is meaningless. Therefore, we suggest that CIoTA’s
agents apply one of the following policies after detecting an
attack: (1) send alerts to a control server, (2) restart the infected
application, or (3) stop the device entirely via the kernel.
Selecting a policy depends on the IoT device’s application and
how critical its operations are.
VI. EVALUATION
To evaluate CIoTA, we used our IoT simulation testbed
(Fig. 3) consisting of 48 Raspberry Pis to emulated two types
of IoT devices: smart cameras and smart light. The executed
attacks were either (1) code injection [21] or (2) code reuse
[6]. Our experiments were carried out as follows:
1) CIoTA agents were installed on each of the Raspberry
Pis, together with a symmetric key (PKI was not used in
the evaluation).
2) After approximately one hour of benign operation, one of
the Pis was attacked with an exploit which then executed
malicious code.
3) The malicious logic behaved as a bot which attempts to
connect to it’s C&C once every minute.
All agents were initialized with the following parameters:
• T (Broadcast interval): one minute
• L (Block size): 20
• pc (Combined model, element-wise consensus): 75%
• α (Verification distance): 0.05
• pthr (Anomaly score threshold): 0.025
A. Performance of the Combined Model
To evaluate the performance of a combined model, we
measured its anomaly score before and after a code injection
attack. The probabilities were averaged over windows of 1000
observations. Fig. 4 shows that by joining more models to-
gether, a stronger consensus is achieved much faster than using
a single model. With L = 20, we can see that the malware’s
activity can be easily detected with zero false positives. Thus,
the knowledge of the many is captured in the combined model,
which assists each agent in distinguishing between new benign
events and malicious activities. The results were similar for
both exploits and use cases.
Fig. 3. IoT simulation testbed consisting of 48 Raspberry Pis
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Fig. 4. The anomaly scores of the combined model ML when created from
various numbers of different agent’s models. The red area marks the code
injection attack, followed by the malicious code’s execution.
B. Attacks Against CIoTA
To evaluate how well CIoTA performs against adversarial
attacks, we examine the case where attacks were performed
when CIoTA is the most vulnerable (at CIoTA’s deployment,
before any device has shared its chain). During this time, we
attacked one or more devices with an exploit, followed by
some malicious code execution. Fig. 5 plots the heat maps
of the linear distance between a random agent’s ML and the
combined model in the partial block (with and without the
infected model). The figure shows that if the malicious code
is not similar to the original application, then other agents will
reject the partial block due to discrepancies in the combined
model (Algorithm 2).
We also investigated the case where the attacker’s mali-
cious code is similar to the application’s control-flow (similar
transitions in memory). As a result, all anomaly scores were
borderline but did not exceed the threshold (no alerts were
raised), and the modified ML was propagated to the other
agents via the partial block of the chain. In this case, we
observed that the other agent’s were still capable of detecting
the attack although they were using the infected model. This
is because Algorithm 1 filter new behaviors which did not
achieve consensus. Fig. 6 illustrates this observation in the
camera use case. The figure shows that even if an attacker
compromises several models, the attacker must compromise at
least pc of the models in the partial block to evade detection.
C. Application’s Overhead
Since CIoTA is designed for resource limited devices, we
measured the CPU utilization and memory consumption during
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Fig. 5. Heat maps of the linear distance of a local model from a combined
model. Left: clean combined model. Right: infected combined model.
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Fig. 6. The anomaly scores of the combined model M using the latest block
B, where various numbers of the models in B have been infected (attacked).
runtime. We note that our code was not optimized (we used the
boost and OpenSSL libraries). Therefore, our results provide
an upper limit for CIoTA’s overhead. The CPU utilization,
memory consumption, and executable size of the agent was
6.5%, 60KB, and 260KB respectively.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced CIoTA: a blockchain-based
solution for collaborative anomaly detection among a large
number of IoT devices. CIoTA continuously train an anomaly
detection model while remaining robust to adversarial attacks.
By utilizing the wisdom of the many, CIoTA can also differ-
entiate between rare benign events and malicious activities.
A disadvantage of CIoTA is that a separate chain must be
published per IoT model/firmware. Therefore CIoTA, in its
present form, is most applicable to large industrial settings and
smart cities. In the future, we plan to extend CIoTA to support
several frameworks and improve its detection capability, e.g.,
by investigating API flows as opposed to the lower level
control-flows.
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